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Corruption continues to make the headlines of our 
newspapers. For instance, Sheldon Silver, the Speaker 
of the New York Assembly, was not only accused of 
steering real estate developers to a law firm that paid 
him kickbacks, but also for funneling state grants to 
a Columbia University doctor who referred asbestos 
claims to a second law firm that then paid Silver 
referral fees.1 Less than a decade ago, FBI Special 
Agent Robert Grant, announcing corruption charges 
against then Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich, said 
“if [Illinois] isn’t the most corrupt state in the United 
States, it is one hell of a competitor.”2 According to 
the 2014 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) Report to the Nations global survey of fraud, 
36.2 percent of all corruption schemes were found 
in government and public administration. Corrup-
tion seems to be the most compatible with other 
fraud scheme types, and resulted in a median loss 
of $200,000 per incident. Further, that 37 percent of 
corruption cases were attributed to unusually close 
associations with the vendor or customer suggests 
conflicts of interest and 
corruption.3
Yet those who inves-
tigate fraud know 
that corruption and 
conflicts of interest 
are notoriously 
difficult to inves-
tigate and even 
more challenging 
to prosecute 
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successfully. Beyond the financial and reputational 
costs, corruption can change the face of a community. 
Consider the assertion: “Over and over, for several 
decades, some Chicago aldermen have given away 
public benefits, like zoning rights and city-owned 
land, to real estate developers who, in turn, have 
lined the aldermen’s pockets and campaign purses.”4 
Although corruption does significant damage to 
public institutions and the private sector, fraud 
prevention experts, government accountants and 
academics know relatively little about its origins 
and causes. There is a dearth of understanding of 
why corruption seems rampant and how corruption 
actually comes about and ensnares its victims.
Corruption and conflicts of interest, along with 
asset misappropriation, and fraudulent statements, 
appear in the ACFE “Fraud Tree.” Before turning to 
what can be done to mitigate the harmful effects of 
corruption, let us first define and understand it, and 
recognize the difficulty of detection and the under-
lying causes of this very human phenomenon.5 
The formidable challenge of detecting corruption 
is frustrating to law enforcement. For other types of 
fraud, victims generally learn of their loss and are 
highly motivated to report it, even sue to be made 
whole. Conversely, consider the career politician who 
develops strong bonds with the vendors that help 
put him in office. When that elected official receives 
lunches, trips, gratuities, or possibly cash, both parties 
are complicit, and therefore neither has an incen-
tive to expose the “other’s” wrongdoing. Corruption, 
by its very nature, breeds complicity because even 
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when one or more 
parties realizes it 
is wrong, perhaps 
even shameful, the 
need for discretion 
and “saving one’s own 
skin” imposes secrecy on 
those involved.
While direct damages 
of public corruption may be 
calculable, the secondary effects of 
anger and mistrust by the constituents 
at large are not only incalculable, they 
can actually encourage other partici-
pants to engage in this conduct out of 
fear of being locked out of the system. 
On a larger, societal scale the erosion 
of trust among interacting parties 
has long-term consequences that 
increase transaction costs in markets 
and society, as a whole. For instance, 
the unsavory activities and reputa-
tions of career politicians discourage 
many otherwise competent and well-
intentioned citizens from ever seeking 
political office. 
What can be done to stop corrup-
tion and conflicts of interest? Is this 
malfeasance an inevitable product 
of the human condition? First, let’s 
examine the causes.
Root Causes: Understanding 
the Social Compact of 
Reciprocity 
For those law enforcement offi-
cials who have spent their careers 
debriefing corrupt public officials, a 
clear pattern becomes evident. While 
this information is helpful to assist 
investigators gathering evidence 
and interviewing participants, and 
it may even be helpful to the judge 
sentencing a defendant, this infor-
mation is rarely shared with entities 
that could actually use it to educate 
or deter someone from engaging in 
corruption.
So what are the root causes of 
corruption? What are law enforce-
ment officials seeing that could 
actually help prevent corruption? 
The simple fact is that corruption is 
a human act — something we have all 
seen and can understand intuitively.6 
“Ethical erosion” is characterized by a 
series of small, sometimes unnoticed 
acts that erode ethical behavior, with 
each act providing a foundation for 
even further erosion.7 However, when 
the slow, deliberative but neverthe-
less ethically corrosive process is 
happening to the elected official 
or corporate executive, they are 
unaware of what is taking place, or 
may have a misplaced confidence in 
their internal, psychological defenses. 
In reality, before they realize what is 
occurring, it’s too late, the trap has 
been sprung, and the unsuspecting 
victim has walked right into it.
So what is it? Let’s begin by under-
standing the relationships between 
government or corporate officials 
and those trying to obtain influence; 
this is best understood as a sales and 
persuasion game. The seller of a good 
or service, or “lobbyist,” is trying to 
obtain influence with the official who 
holds power. Whether they know it 
by this name or not, those influence-
peddlers understand only too well the 
underlying principle and sociocultural 
construct, i.e., “the social compact of 




panying sense of obligation is its 
pervasiveness in human culture.8 
Social psychologists and anthro-
pologists have studied the concept 
of reciprocity for decades. Indeed, 
some scholars have attributed the 
very nature of humans to reciprocity.9 
They claim humans survived because 
our ancestors learned to share goods 
and services “in an honored network 
of obligation.” Thus, the idea that 
humans are indebted to repay gifts 
and favors is a unique aspect of 
human culture. Cultural anthropolo-
gists support this idea in what they 
call the “web of indebtedness” where 
reciprocity is viewed as an adaptive 
mechanism to enhance survival. 
Interestingly, there is social pres-
sure exerted on those who receive 
but don’t give back; they are disparag-
ingly called “moochers,” “free riders” 
or “social loafers.”
Government and corporate offi-
cials are decision-makers. They make 
purchasing decisions for products and 
services, they decide where roads will 
be built, they are constantly making 
zoning decisions, and they have the 
power to expand or contract govern-
ment services. How can a vendor 
influence the decision-makers to 
purchase their product or service?
Some of the best information of 
how vendors exploit officials has been 
learned through their cooperation 
with law enforcement. After a plea 
agreement, while cooperating with 
the government, defendants may 
recount their methods and tactics; 
Corruption, by its very nature, breeds complicity because 
even when one or more parties realizes it is wrong, perhaps 
even shameful, the need for discretion and “saving one’s 
own skin” imposes secrecy on those involved.
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When the influence-peddler is 
using the social compact of reci-
procity to gain influence, the things 
of value need to be given incremen-
tally. A vendor handing a briefcase 
full of cash to a government official 
on the first meeting would likely be 
too abrupt, too brazen, and would 
neither be expected nor tolerated. 
Therefore, the corrupting process is 
slow and deliberate. This allows the 
official to incrementally rationalize 
each gratuity being received. It is like 
the proverbial frog in a heated pot: If 
you throw the frog into a boiling pot 
of water, he will jump out. If you put 
the frog in cool water and gradually 
turn up the heat, you can cook him 
to death. It is the same process with 
officials. You have to give the official 
time to rationalize each incremental 
gift. Once he starts down that slip-
pery slope, speed gathers, and there 
is no getting back up the hill. This 
“boiled frog” logic explains the nature 
and life-cycle of the relationship. 
Government entities and mature 
corporations have policies in place 
to prevent corruption. Government 
entities likely have both ethics rules 
and criminal statutes that prevent the 
receiving of gifts, monetary or other-
wise. Corporations typically have a 
code of conduct, antifraud policies, 
and a conflicts-of-interest policy. 
Public officials and company execu-
tives know these rules and know they 
will be presumed to have known 
these rules if caught and challenged. 
and a common, predictable scenario 
gets revealed:
When the politician saw me 
coming, he knew he was getting 
something. The first encounter 
may just be me giving my busi-
ness card, but I always made sure 
his hand was out and I could see 
his palm. The next encounter 
might be a pen or book, but he 
was going to walk away with 
something that he knew was 
from my firm. This gift- giving 
escalates to meals and entertain-
ment. Eventually, the relation-
ship looks more like a friendship 
than a business transaction. Trips 
to the family home, an outing 
to Vegas, or a quick trip on the 
corporate jet, it’s all about giving 
the official something. What 
you’re developing is the ace in 
hole. You never know when you 
need to call it, but you know it 
is there. And when you do call 
in your chit, this is when it gets 
beautiful. You both know you 
just straight-up own him. You 
can now ply him with envelopes 
of cash and everyone pretends 
like nothing is happening. 
Those attempting to gain access 
will have different modus operandi, but 
effectively they all exploit the social 
compact of reciprocity. Conversely, 
it is enlightening to understand the 
thought process of those officials 
charged with corruption. Many have 
a difficult time admitting they did 
anything wrong. 
For those officials who pleaded 
guilty and cooperated, their story 
goes something like this:
I have always done what is 
in the best interest of my con-
stituents. I work very hard at this 
job and have done a lot of good. 
This job is difficult. There are a 
lot of campaign rules and I don’t 
always pay attention to details. 
Sure, people gave me money, 
but I assumed it was campaign 
contributions. And yes we go 
to a lot of dinners, but that’s 
how business is done in the real 
world. As for the gifts and trips, 
it was relatively insignificant and 
we always accomplished a lot 
of good on those trips. We may 
have met in the political world, 
but we are really good friends. 
In hindsight, I can see this looks 
bad. When my wife asked me 
why I always paid in cash and 
where was the money coming 
from, it finally hit me: I had 
somehow sold my office.
Jack Abramoff, arguably the most 
corrupt lobbyist in U.S. history, was 
the master of this craft until FBI 
agents arrested him. At the height 
of Abramoff’s corruption machine, 
he was giving out an unimaginable 
number of skybox tickets, pricey 
restaurant meals and golf junkets to 
government officials. He even estab-
lished his own high-end restaurant 
near Capitol Hill called “Signatures” 
where he regularly treated elected 
and appointed federal officials and 
their staffers. The ingenuity behind 
and efficiency of this setup was that 
he could sit at his favorite table and 
peddle influence on a large scale.10
The social compact of reciprocity 
works in tandem with the slippery 
slope principle. The slippery slope 
helps explain how one rationalizes 
wrongdoing. Fraudsters, or corrupt 
public officials, resort to rationaliza-
tion as the human psyche does not 
allow oneself to wake up, look in the 
mirror, and see a fraudster looking 
back; the fraudster or corrupt public 
official inevitably rationalizes his or 
her conduct. 
The human psyche does 
not allow oneself to wake 
up, look in the mirror, and 
see a fraudster looking 
back; the fraudster or 
corrupt public official 
inevitably rationalizes  
his or her conduct.
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This is where their rationalization 
process is critical. The official needs 
to convince himself, as well as justify 
to others, that receiving the thing of 
value does not violate these rules. 
Each incremental gift received must 
somehow be explained and rational-
ized. The official may rationalize that 
the gifts are part of a friendship or 
that the official is just such a likable 
person that people want to bestow 
gifts without any expectation of 
reward. Regardless of the thought 
process, it cannot be viewed as some-
thing of value received in their official 
capacity because that is a violation 
of the rules. Ego trumps common 
sense and becomes a fatal blind spot 
in such cases.
Prevention and Deterrence 
Strategies
Corruption is the most difficult 
type of fraud to be detected because 
the victims are generally unaware of 
its occurrence. Accordingly, preven-
tion has to play a much more promi-
nent role in mitigating harm.
Government officials generally 
come into office for the right reasons. 
Elected officials resonate with their 
peers, their message appeals to their 
constituents and they truly want 
to bring about positive change. 
Appointed officials may also choose 
government service for altruistic 
reasons. Officials presumably do not 
enter office with the idea of wanting 
to profit from bribes. Even corporate 
executives who engage in corruption 
and take advantage of conflict-of-
interest situations, probably did not 
set out to engage in this conduct from 
the start.11 
The problem with policies is the 
lack of implementation by those 
charged with governance. Writing a 
policy or passing an ethics ordinance 
is easy. Creating continued awareness, 
instruction, and training of the poli-
cies is resource-intensive and costly. 
More complicating is the fact that no 
official views himself or herself as 
corrupt. Whereas those in charge of 
governance may fund an ethics aware-
ness program for their organization, 
they are also just as likely to find 
themselves too busy to attend. Such 
an attitude smacks of hypocrisy.
Leaders and management must 
strive to model appropriate behaviors, 
and thus lead by example in commu-
nicating the proper tone from the top. 
Their commitment to a strong, fraud-
resistant culture should be manifest, 
and education on fraud and ethics 
awareness should be the norm. Codes 
of conduct should be regularly revis-
ited and updated, and ethics hotlines 
should be emphasized. Swift action 
should be taken to deal with ethical 
lapses, especially when senior execu-
tives are involved because there is 
no room for the perception of a 
“double-standard” within an 
operation. It is important to 
create a perception of detec-
tion, which can be a most 
useful strategy for deter-
rence and fraud prevention. 
Newly appointed officials should be 
required to attend a program called 
Ethics Awareness for Newly Elected Offi-
cials. They should see and hear from 
officials-turned-convicted-felons, 
including from videos of testimo-
nies, and stories reported in the TV 
program, American Greed, etc. These 
former officials provide the narra-
tive of how they transitioned from 
working for the people to receiving 
cash from the people — describing 
the “boiled frog” public corruption 
syndrome in a detailed fashion with 
real-world examples. Former law 
enforcement officials also provide 
real-world examples based on rela-
tive experience. 
If such programs are implemented, 
an official would have a greater 
awareness of constantly being in 
the crosshairs of lobbyists and influ-
ence-peddlers. They could more fully 
appreciate the behaviors of others. 
The official could make a conscious 
decision to refuse the initial gratuity 
and thus nip the corrupting process 
in the proverbial bud. In other words, 
they could jump out of the “hot water” 
before it cooks them.  
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